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I. Introduction
Since the late 1990s, the United States has been engulfed in
a “tidal wave” of accounting fraud.1 In 2001, Enron entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy following the discovery of illegal
accounting practices.2 Investors lost nearly $80 billion.3 Enron’s
reign as the largest accounting fraudster in U.S. history did not
last long; less than a year later, WorldCom filed bankruptcy
following the collapse of an $11 billion fraudulent accounting
scheme.4 WorldCom investors would likely envy Enron
investors—they lost nearly three times more.5
1. Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under
the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2007).
2. See Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone
on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 453–59 (2003) (detailing
Enron’s fraudulent accounting scheme).
3. Id. at 449.
4. See Mark, supra note 1, at 1099 (describing Enron’s fraud as the
“largest in U.S. history”); see also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp.
2d 628, 640–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing in detail the accounting fraud
perpetrated by WorldCom during the late 1990s and early 2000s).
5. See Emily N. Seymour, Note, Refining the Source of the Risk:
Suspension and Debarment in the Post-Andersen Era, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 357,
372 (2005) (arguing that WorldCom’s outside auditors should have been

A DUE DILIGENCE DEFENSE IN § 13(b)

903

Congress responded swiftly, passing the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
of 2002.6 To restore investor confidence in capital markets,7
Congress enhanced corporate audit controls and increased the
authority and oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).8 Coupled with the new provisions in
Sarbanes–Oxley, the SEC can combat inaccurate financial
records using two provisions implemented decades earlier.
Enacted in 1977, § 13(b)9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(’34 Act)10 requires companies to implement procedures designed
to protect the accuracy of their books and records.11 Promulgated
in 1979, Rule 13b2–2 supplements § 13(b) by preventing officers
and directors from making misleading statements to outside
auditors.12
Currently, circuit courts are split over whether Rule 13b2–2
contains a scienter requirement.13 Whereas the Second and
Eighth Circuits have found no scienter requirement in
disbarred due to the magnitude of the accounting fraud).
6. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101–1107, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2012)) (overhauling corporate financial regulation).
Congress passed Sarbanes–Oxley overwhelmingly: 99–0 in the Senate and 423–
3 in the House. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections,
and Audits in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 45 n.7 (2007). The
widespread support and rapid congressional response were likely due to the
“media frenzy” surrounding Enron and WorldCom. Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005).
7. See Pearson & Mark, supra note 6, at 45–46 (listing the four major
goals of Sarbanes–Oxley as: (1) improving corporate governance; (2)
strengthening corporate disclosures; (3) enhancing corporate accounting
procedures; and (4) expanding SEC oversight).
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a)–(b) (2012) (granting the SEC authority to
investigate violations of Sarbanes–Oxley); Pearson & Mark, supra note 6, at 45–
46 (discussing the four major goals of Sarbanes–Oxley).
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp.
11. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (requiring companies to keep their books and
records accurate to “a reasonable detail”).
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2–2 (2014) (proscribing materially misleading
statements or omissions made to outside auditors).
13. Compare SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943, 955 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding no
scienter requirement in Rule 13b2–2), and SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 740–
41 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), with SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1219–20 (9th Cir.
2011) (finding a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2–2).
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Rule 13b2–2,14 the Ninth Circuit has held the opposite.15 This
debate offers an opportunity to reevaluate the costs and benefits
of these provisions. These provisions protect the accuracy and
breadth of corporate financial records.16 Because investors rely on
the disclosure of corporate information, inaccurate and
incomplete financial records threaten the efficiency of capital
markets.17 Absent a scienter requirement, however, these
provisions could impose liability on good-faith actors,18 potentially
increasing the cost of compliance as companies take excessive
action to avoid liability.19 Thus, the circuit split raises a question:
Without scienter, do the costs of § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 exceed
their benefits?
This Note argues that, while § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 do not
require scienter as a matter of law, Congress can better align the
costs and benefits of these provisions by adding a due diligence
defense. Part II examines the policy rationales behind § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2 by comparing these provisions to other aspects of
federal securities law. Part III discusses the current divide
between the Second and Eighth Circuits on one end and the
Ninth Circuit on the other. In particular, Part III contends that
14. See Das, 723 F.3d at 955 (finding no scienter requirement in
Rule 13b2–2); McNulty, 137 F.3d at 740 (same).
15. See Todd, 642 F.3d at 1220 (finding a scienter requirement in
Rule 13b2–2).
16. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363
(2d Cir. 1973) (“[A] major congressional policy behind the securities laws in
general, and the antifraud provisions in particular, is the protection of investors
who rely on the completeness and accuracy of information made available to
them.”).
17. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“Dissemination of false or misleading information by companies to members of
the investing public may distort the efficient workings of the securities markets
and injure investors who rely on the accuracy and completeness of the
company’s public disclosures.”).
18. See Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and
Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments
and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1979 WL
173674, at *9 (Feb. 15, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 SEC Release] (noting that
several commenters to Rule 13b2–2 argued it would be unfair to impose liability
on good-faith actors).
19. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976)
(arguing that corporate managers will take greater precaution to comply with
governing regulations as the risk of liability increases).

A DUE DILIGENCE DEFENSE IN § 13(b)

905

the Ninth Circuit is wrong. Part IV then questions whether the
other circuits are right. Offering specific language, Part IV grafts
a due diligence defense onto § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2, arguing
that this proposal would strike the proper cost–benefit balance
between ensuring accurate bookkeeping and imposing costs on
public companies.
II. Background on § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2
One of the primary goals of federal securities law is the
disclosure of corporate information,20 and much of federal
securities regulation mandates such disclosure.21 But what good
would disclosure serve if the disclosed information was
inaccurate? Section 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 bolster the accuracy of
financial records and thus the accuracy of disclosed information.22
This Part begins by discussing § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2, focusing
in particular on the policy goals underlying these provisions.23 To
fully develop the policy rationale, this Part then compares § 13(b)
and Rule 13b2–2 to other provisions in federal securities law.24
A. Section 13(b) of the ’34 Act
Congress passed § 13(b) as part of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).25 On May 12, 1977, the SEC
20. See Steven J. Cleveland, The NYSE as State Actor?: Rational Actors,
Behavioral Insights & Joint Investigations, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (stating
that federal securities law addresses “two principal goals . . . disclosure and the
prevention of fraud”); Lyman Johnson, Why Register Hedge Fund Advisors—A
Comment, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 719 (2013) (indicating that, while federal
securities law attempts to facilitate capital formation, this goal often conflicts
with the goal of protecting investors).
21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012) (mandating disclosure of certain
information in registration statements); id. § 77j (prospectuses); id. § 78m(a)
(periodic reports).
22. See id. § 77b(b) (instructing the SEC to promulgate rules under the ’34
Act promoting efficiency, competition, and capital formation); Dresser Indus.,
628 F.2d at 1377 (claiming that accurate financial information promotes
efficiency in capital markets).
23. Infra Part II.A–B.
24. Infra Part II.C.
25. See Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 101–204, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
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submitted to Congress a report outlining extensive bribery of
foreign officials by domestic corporations.26 Rather than focus on
the bribery itself, the report emphasized that the bribery was
undisclosed on financial records.27 At the SEC’s request, § 13(b)
heightened corporate accounting oversight through two
mechanisms: reporting requirements and internal audit controls.
Section 13(b)(2)(A) provides reporting requirements. It states
that every reporting issuer “shall make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer.”28 Two parts of this language are critical to understanding
the breadth of § 13(b). First, Congress did not intend the
language “transactions and dispositions of the assets” to limit
§ 13(b) to only asset-based transactions.29 Instead, § 13(b)
“encompasses accuracy in accounts of every character.”30 Second,
Congress believed the phrase “in reasonable detail” would remove
inadvertent and minor accounting oversights from § 13(b)’s
reach.31
Section 13(b) attempts to strengthen corporate accounting,
but it does so at a cost. On one hand, investors rely on financials

§§ 78dd–1 to –3) (adding numerous provisions to the ’34 Act in response to
widespread bribery of foreign officials).
26. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (1977) (discussing the need for the
FCPA). The original version of the FCPA passed the Senate unanimously in
September 1976. Id. at 2. The House, however, failed to take up the legislation
before adjourning in October 1976, so Congress did not pass the bill until 1977.
Id. The year-long break did not dampen the widespread support—the bill passed
the House unanimously. See A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting
Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section 102 of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977), 34 BUS. LAW. 307, 308 (1978) [hereinafter Guide
to Section 13b] (noting that the FCPA passed the Senate by voice vote in 1977).
27. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (stating that the “undisclosed” bribery
presented a “serious breach” of the SEC’s “system of corporate disclosure”);
Guide to Section 13b, supra note 26, at 308 (“[Section 13(b) is] in no way linked
either to overseas business activities or to corrupt practices . . . .”).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012).
29. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 n.5 (stating that § 13(b) also covers
financial records regarding equity and liabilities).
30. Id.
31. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that the “in
reasonable detail” language should alleviate the concern that § 13(b) liability
would arise for every single inaccuracy in financial records).
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disclosed in periodic reports.32 These periodic reports aggregate
all financial transactions over a period of time.33 Consequently,
all transactions bear, to some extent, on the accuracy of
information disclosed to investors. Thus, § 13(b) reaches all
transactions to promote accurate disclosure.34 On the other hand,
large corporations can have millions of transactions per day.35
Accounting for all of these transactions is costly.36 In addition,
§ 13(b) could potentially subject a company to liability for minor
oversights in accounting for these transactions.37 Recognizing
these costs, the “in reasonable detail” language may exempt
minor oversights from § 13(b)’s reach.38
It appears, however, that Congress tipped the scale in favor
of accuracy. Congress recognized that financials “constitute the
foundations of our system of corporate disclosure.”39 To maintain
“public confidence” in capital markets, Congress imposed
“affirmative duties” designed to keep corporate recordkeeping
“honest.”40 And although the “in reasonable detail” language
limits the scope of § 13(b), other provisions in federal securities
law offer greater protection.41
32. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363
(2d Cir. 1973) (noting that both the disclosure requirements and the antifraud
provisions in federal securities law serve to provide investors with adequate
information); Michael A. Lynn, Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory
of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b–5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 655 (1982)
(arguing that accurate corporate disclosures allow investors to rely on the
integrity of pricing mechanisms in the capital markets).
33. See, e.g., Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 27, 2014)
(stating that Apple’s net income from all transactions occurring in fiscal year
2014 surpassed $41 billion).
34. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 n.5 (1977) (stating that § 13(b) covers all
financial records).
35. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 9 (addressing the concern that
the volume of daily transactions for large corporations would make compliance
with corporate accounting requirements nearly impossible).
36. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (noting that the requirements of § 13(b) will
impose costs on companies).
37. See id. (stating that only unreasonable violations of § 13(b) are
actionable).
38. See id. (“[S]tandards of reasonableness must apply.”).
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id.
41. See infra Part II.C (comparing § 13(b) to other provisions in federal
securities law).
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The best evidence of Congress’s commitment to accurate
financial records is the additional requirements imposed by
§ 13(b)(2)(B).42 This subsection requires internal audit controls,
stating that every issuer shall:
[D]evise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide
reasonable
assurances that—
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded
as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or
any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to
maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is
permitted only in accordance with management’s general or
specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for
assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences.43

Similar to § 13(b)(2)(A), this subsection is limited by a
standard of reasonableness.44 Here, this standard enables
Congress to do two things. First, it allows Congress to defer to
financial experts in determining the adequacy of internal audit
controls.45 Indeed, Congress suggested that outside auditors
recommend improvements to audit controls.46 Second, Congress
recognized that internal audit controls are costly.47 The
reasonableness standard gives executives flexibility in managing
these costs by allowing them to adopt cost-efficient procedures.48
In this manner, Congress attempts to reduce the cost of
compliance by deferring to accounting professionals.49
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012) (imposing audit control
requirements).
43. Id.
44. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (1977) (“Here, standards of reasonableness
must apply.”).
45. See id. (indicating that the accounting standards in § 13(b) come from
“authoritative accounting literature”).
46. See id. (“Auditor’s comments and suggestions to management on
possible improvements are to be encouraged.”).
47. See id. (arguing that the benefits of this subsection outweigh the costs
imposed on registered companies).
48. See id. (allowing management to evaluate audit procedures with a cost–
benefit analysis).
49. See id. (stating that this subsection allows management to exercise
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B. Rule 13b2–2 of the ’34 Act
The SEC promulgated Rule 13b2–2 to promote compliance
with § 13(b).50 It reads:
(a) No director or officer of an issuer shall, directly or
indirectly: (1) Make or cause to be made a materially false or
misleading statement to an accountant in connection with; or
(2) Omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, any
material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading, to an accountant in connection with:
(i) Any audit, review or examination of the financial
statements of the issuer required to be made pursuant to this
subpart; or (ii) The preparation or filing of any document or
report required to be filed with the Commission pursuant to
this subpart or otherwise.51

Rule 13b2–2 bars two types of statements made to accountants in
connection with an audit or SEC filing. First, it bars “materially
false or misleading” affirmative statements.52 Second, it bars the
omission of any material fact necessary to make affirmative
statements “not misleading.”53
In the Rule’s notice-and-comment proceedings, several
commenters expressed concerns regarding the cost of
compliance.54 First, many commenters suggested that Rule 13b2–2
should include a scienter requirement.55 Otherwise, Rule 13b2–2
may unfairly impose liability on good-faith actors.56 Second, many
professional judgment in implementing audit controls).
50. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that Rule 13b2–2 is
“necessary or appropriate” to implement § 13(b)).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2–2(a) (2014).
52. Id. § 240.13b2–2(a)(1).
53. Id. § 240.13b2–2(a)(2).
54. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 10–14 (discussing and
rejecting several changes to Rule 13b2–2 suggested by approximately eighty
commenters).
55. See id. at 12 (declining to insert a scienter requirement). The concept of
scienter is discussed later in this Note. See infra Part II.C.3.
56. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 9 (“[I]t would be unfair to
impose liability on persons who acted in good faith and made inadvertent or
unintentional mistakes.”). This argument was made regarding Rule 13b2–1, but
the SEC noted that the same concern was raised with Rule 13b2–2 and applied
the same analysis to both rules. See id. at 12 (refusing to add a scienter
requirement to Rule 13b2–2 for “the reasons set forth above . . . with respect to
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commenters believed that violations would be “inevitable”
because large companies have an “incredible volume of
transactions that must be recorded on a daily basis.”57 Both of
these concerns could lead individuals to take excessive steps to
prevent liability.58
The SEC dismissed both of these suggestions, concluding
that the benefits of the rule outweighed its costs. The SEC
associated inaccurate financial records with corporate fraud,
claiming that fraud is rarely reflected in corporate books and that
corporate books are often inaccurate to conceal fraudulent
activities.59 Rule 13b2–2, the SEC contended, would “act as a
deterrent to the falsification of corporate books,” thus limiting
corporate fraud.60 The SEC believed that deterring fraud
outweighed the compliance concerns: “[T]he Commission has
decided that the advantages of the new Rule outweigh the
potential disadvantages suggested by certain commentators.”61
The commitment to accurate corporate records is clear.
Rather than merely require reasonably accurate financials,62
Congress demands procedures that ensure reasonably accurate
financials.63 Congress does so recognizing the high costs of
internal audit controls, noting that the benefits of accurate
financials outweigh the costs.64 And in case this “belt and
Rule 13b2–1”).
57. Id.
58. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976)
(arguing that corporate managers will take greater precaution as the risk of
liability increases); cf. Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243, 265
(2007) (arguing that increasing potential liability in the medical malpractice
context would cause doctors to take “excessive precautions” beyond what is
socially optimal).
59. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 1 (arguing that the desire to
conceal fraudulent activities often leads individuals to falsify financial records).
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id. at 12.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring companies to keep their
books and records accurate to a reasonable detail).
63. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (requiring internal audit controls designed to
protect the accuracy of corporate records).
64. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (1977) (“The expected benefits to be derived
from the conscientious discharge of these responsibilities are of basic importance
to investors and the maintenance of the integrity of our capital market
system.”).
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suspenders” approach is not enough,65 Congress imposes criminal
liability on individuals who “knowingly” violate § 13(b).66
Moreover, the SEC crafted Rule 13b2–2 to impose liability on
certain good-faith actors, determining that the benefits of
accuracy surpassed the cost of compliance.67 The aim is clear:
eliminate inaccuracy.
C. Comparison to Other Provisions in Federal Securities Law
Although the accuracy of financial records predominated the
above discussion, the bulk of federal securities law focuses
elsewhere. Primarily, securities law prevents corporate fraud and
promotes public disclosure.68 Often, however, the pursuit of these
goals is overly broad, so Congress and the courts have limited
different provisions of federal securities law in many ways. By
exploring the varying scopes of these provisions, we can gain a
better understanding of the policy rationale behind § 13(b). Thus,
this subpart compares § 13(b) to two other securities provisions—
Rule 10b–5 under the ’34 Act69 and § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 (’33 Act)70—along three different axes: scope of liability,71
materiality,72 and scienter.73 First, however, this subpart
describes Rule 10b–5 and § 11 in broad terms.
Promulgated under § 10(b) of the ’34 Act,74 Rule 10b–5 is the
“catchall” antifraud provision.75 It prohibits any deceptive or
65. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 189 (3d ed. 2012).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(5).
67. See 1979 SEC Report, supra note 18, at 12 (“[T]he Commission has
decided that the advantages of the new Rule outweigh the potential
disadvantages suggested by certain commentators.”).
68. See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that federal securities law
addresses “two principal goals . . . disclosure and the prevention of fraud”).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive
practices relating to the sale or purchase of any security).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (providing liability for materially misleading
statements or omissions in registration statements).
71. Infra Part II.C.1.
72. Infra Part II.C.2.
73. Infra Part II.C.3.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
75. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976); see Samuel W.
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manipulative “device, scheme, or artifice” in connection with a
securities transaction.76 There is an implied private right of
action77 containing six elements: (1) a material misrepresentation
or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.78
Section 11 creates a private right of action for misleading
registration statements. 79 Similar to Rule 10b–5, it requires
proof of a material misrepresentation or omission; a connection
with the purchase or sale of any security; and economic loss. 80
Unlike Rule 10b–5, however, it does not require proof of
scienter, reliance, or loss causation. 81 Due to the different
causes of action under these provisions, the scope of liability
varies substantially.
1. Scope of Liability
Generally, limits on civil enforcement actions balance two
interests: judicial economy and prosecution of wrongdoers.
Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 540 (2011) (stating that
Rule 10b–5 may be the most important rule in the history of American
administrative law).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(a) to (c) (2014).
77. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (1946)
(recognizing for the first time that Rule 10b–5 includes an implied private right
of action); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(noting that the private cause of action under Rule 10b–5 is a “judicial oak” that
has grown from a “legislative acorn”); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that the existence of an implied private right of
action under Rule 10b–5 is “simply beyond peradventure”).
78. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (noting
the six requirements of a 10b–5 private action). For the purposes of this subpart,
it is more important to note the number of elements rather than analyze the
requirements of each. See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (arguing
that Rule 10b–5’s burdensome cause of action limits the potential for liability).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (providing liability for materially
misleading statements or omissions in registration statements).
80. See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 195
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“To state a claim under section 11, an injured plaintiff must
allege only that a defendant made or participated in making a ‘material
misstatement or omission’ in a registration statement for a security the plaintiff
acquired . . . .”).
81. See id. (noting that § 11 does not require the intent to defraud).
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Although limiting civil actions promotes judicial economy by
preventing “inconsequential or tenuous claims,” 82 the same
action may allow wrongdoers to escape liability while failing to
compensate injured parties. 83 This tension rears its head
throughout federal securities law, and the law limits liability
in a variety of ways as reflected by comparing Rule 10b–5, § 11,
and § 13(b).
Rule 10b–5 is limited by sheer complexity. 84 The cause of
action is relatively broad; any person can sue under Rule 10b–5
so long as they bought or sold securities due to the company’s
fraud.85 Nevertheless, Rule 10b–5 is one of the hardest actions
to prove in federal securities law, requiring proof of six
elements resembling those for common law fraud.86 Each of
these elements poses unique issues and stands as a barrier to
private plaintiffs. 87 Given the rule’s scope, the law makes it
more difficult to prove a Rule 10b–5 violation.
82. Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1185 (1950); see Christopher R. Dollase, Comment, The Appeal of
Rind: Limitations of Actions in Securities and Exchange Commission Civil
Enforcement Actions, 49 BUS. LAW. 1793, 1793 (1994) (noting that limitations on
civil actions encourage plaintiffs to file their claims quickly and protect
defendants from old and tenuous claims).
83. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Time Bars in Specialized Federal
Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1015 (1980) (“[W]hile the wrongdoer escapes liability, the
injured party is left without a remedy.”).
84. See Perry E. Wallace Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon,
Rodriguez, and the New Rules: Can Investors’ Rights Really Be Protected?, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1249 (1990) (noting that private plaintiffs must prove the
“complex elements” of a Rule 10b–5 cause of action); Comment, A Role for the
10b–5 Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 460, 464 (1981) (arguing that the
complexity of the Rule 10b–5 cause of action results in “severe enforcement
difficulties”); Joseph Cachery III, Comment, Lampf v. Gilbertson: Rule 10b–5’s
Time Has Come, 69 DEN. U. L. REV. 135, 147–48 (1992) (“Any survey of Rule
10b–5 claims clearly demonstrates the complexity . . . of such causes of action.”);
Patricia Groot, Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen Through In
Re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1146 (2009) (noting that Rule 10b–5 cases often
require “complex market efficiency analyses” and substantial expert witness
testimony).
85. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975)
(finding that the plaintiff class in a Rule 10b–5 action includes everyone who
purchased or sold a security due to fraud).
86. See Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (listing
the six elements of a 10b–5 cause of action).
87. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 (1991)
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Section 11 is more limited in scope than Rule 10b–5.88
According to Justice Thurgood Marshall: “Although limited in
scope, § 11 places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff. In
contrast, § 10(b) is a ‘catchall’ antifraud provision, but it
requires a plaintiff to carry a heavier burden to establish a
cause of action.”89 Rather than limit § 11 through complexity,
however, the law limits § 11 in a different way. Notably,
§ 11(a) limits potential defendants to five classes of people. 90 In
addition, § 11 plaintiffs must “trace” their shares to a
misleading registration statement.91 Tracing is practically
impossible where the issuer has made multiple offerings
because the “tainted” shares under a misleading registration
statement become comingled with “untainted” shares already
in the market. 92 As a result, § 11 applies to a distinct class of
actors performing a distinct task—corporate executives and
experts compiling a registration statement. 93
Section 13(b) is the most limited of these three provisions,
and the law, once again, limits § 13(b) in a different fashion.
Section 13(b) is plaintiff friendly; unlike Rule 10b–5, § 13(b)
does not require proof of materiality, reliance, or causation. 94 It
(deciding whether plaintiffs can claim that a statement of opinion is materially
misleading); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988) (deciding whether
plaintiffs can establish reliance by claiming they relied on the integrity of
market price of a stock); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 187–88
(1976) (deciding whether plaintiffs can establish scienter by showing mere
negligence).
88. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)
(comparing the scope of liability between § 11 and Rule 10b–5).
89. Id.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5) (2012) (limiting § 11 liability to five
classes of defendants).
91. See Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 2005)
(imposing a strict tracing requirement). In Krim, the Fifth Circuit found that
the plaintiff could not establish tracing even though the probability that the
plaintiff had at least one traceable share was “very nearly 100%.” Id. at 492 n.6.
92. See id. at 498 (“Appellants point out that, given the fungible nature of
stocks within a street name certificate, it is virtually impossible to differentiate
[public offering] shares from [nonpublic-offering] shares.”).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (limiting § 11 liability to five classes of people
who work on a registration statement).
94. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four
Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1650 (2006) (charting the requirements of
the causes of actions under Rule 10b–5, § 11, and § 13(b)).
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only requires proof of unreasonable inaccuracy in corporate
records.95 However, there is no private right of action. 96
Instead, only the SEC can bring a § 13(b) action.97 Thus
Congress limited § 13(b) by vesting enforcement exclusively in
the SEC.98
So why have Congress and the courts limited these
provisions in such fashion? The Supreme Court’s decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores99 may provide an answer.
There, the Court addressed the outer limits of Rule 10b–5.100
Relying predominately on policy,101 the Court held that
individuals who failed to buy or sell securities in a company due
to fraud could not sue under Rule 10b–5.102
The Court noted that three groups cannot sue under
Rule 10b–5: (1) those who refused to buy shares in a company due
to fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions that made the
company appear less attractive;103 (2) those who refused to sell
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (requiring companies to keep books and
records accurate to a reasonable detail).
96. See, e.g., In re Remec Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (S.D.
Cal. 2005) (“The parties recognize that there is no private right of action under
[§ 13(b)(2)] and therefor [sic] no separate cause of action is stated under the
statute.”); Davis v. DCB Fin. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 664, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(“However, § 13(b) does not provide for a private right of action.”).
97. See Davis, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 673 (dismissing a § 13(b) claim in a
private suit because § 13(b) does not provide a private cause of action). Over the
last decade, from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2014, the SEC has brought
roughly 1,325 actions under § 13(b). Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml
(last
updated Mar. 20, 2015) (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) (accessed by searching
“13(b)”, selecting only “litigation”, and limiting date range to January 1, 2004
through January 1, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See Talley, supra note 94, at 1650 (charting the requirements of the
cause of actions under Rule 10b–5, § 11, and § 13(b)).
99. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
100. See id. at 725 (deciding whether individuals who neither purchased nor
sold securities could sue an issuer under Rule 10b–5).
101. See id. at 737 (“It is therefore proper that we consider . . . what may be
described as policy considerations . . . .”).
102. See id. (indicating that this holding bars three classes of plaintiffs from
suing under Rule 10b–5).
103. While this scenario seems unlikely—why would a company mislead the
public to believe the company was doing poorly?—Blue Chip presented exactly
these circumstances. In 1963, the United States filed an antitrust action against
Blue Chip, and a court ultimately required Blue Chip to sell some of its common
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shares in a company due to fraudulent misrepresentations or
omissions that made the company appear more attractive; and
(3) others related to the issuer who suffer a loss due to the
fraud.104 Failing to compensate these injured parties is a “social
cost,” but the Court concluded that the limitation’s benefits
outweighed these costs.105
The Court’s primary concern was “vexatious litigation,” or
strike suits.106 The Court stated that many actions under federal
securities law have tremendous settlement potential despite
being difficult to win at trial.107 This settlement value arises
because companies engaged in lawsuits bear not only litigation
expenses but also costs associated with the disruption of normal
business activity.108 The propensity for strike suits is exacerbated
by “liberal discovery” provisions, which plaintiffs can use to
increase costs and therefore increase the chance of settlement.109
The Court further concluded that recognizing these plaintiffs
would force the courts to decide “hazy issues.”110 To establish
reliance, most plaintiffs would use “uncorroborated oral evidence”
by stating, for instance, that they read a company’s fraudulent
prospectus or heard a company’s fraudulent misrepresentation on
the news.111 This could increase the likelihood of strike suits
because defendants would have no means to refute these
claims.112
stock to certain retailers. Id. at 725–26. To deter retailers from buying these
shares, the plaintiffs alleged, Blue Chip gave pessimistic projections about the
company’s projected growth. Id. at 726. If Blue Chip dissuaded retailers from
accepting the offering, it could then offer the shares to the public at a
substantially higher price. Id. at 726–27.
104. See id. (discussing the three classes of plaintiffs barred from bringing a
10b–5 action).
105. Id. at 741.
106. Id. at 740.
107. See id. (arguing that these actions “have a settlement value to the
plaintiff out of proportion to its prospect of success at trial”).
108. See id. (arguing that some litigation costs may be “totally unrelated to
the lawsuit”).
109. See id. at 741 (stating that liberal discovery rules are a “cost rather
than a benefit” when they are abused in this fashion).
110. Id. at 743.
111. Id. at 746.
112. See id.
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These concerns are just as prevalent in § 13(b). Because
§ 13(b) is less burdensome than Rule 10b–5, the increased chance
of success should increase the number of strike suits.113 And
proving the claim would be just as speculative.114 Imagine, for
instance, that Exxon Mobil violated § 13(b). As of June 30, 2014,
Exxon Mobil had over 4.2 billion outstanding shares of common
stock.115 In a private § 13(b) action, shareholders could simply
claim that they reviewed one of Exxon’s public disclosures, which
would reflect the inaccurate financial records.116 Courts may
accept these bare assertions because the entire public disclosure
regime assumes that investors rely on the information
disclosed.117 In this scenario, the litigation costs could far exceed
the benefits of accurate financial information.118 Because § 13(b)

The very real risk in permitting those in respondent’s position to sue
under Rule 10b-5 is that the door will be open to recovery of
substantial damages on the part of one who offers only his own
testimony to prove that he ever consulted a prospectus of the issuer,
that he paid any attention to it, or that the representations contained
in it damaged him.
113. See Aguirre, supra note 2, at 479 (noting that the Supreme Court has
narrowed the requirements of a Rule 10b–5 violation to limit frivolous claims);
see also Cornelius J. Golden & Charles E.M. Kolb, The Export Trading Company
Act of 1982: An American Response to Foreign Competition, 58 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 743, 779 (1983) (noting that placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs can
reduce the likelihood of strike suits).
114. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 743 (concluding that parties would litigate
“hazy issues” if Rule 10b–5 did not restrict the class of potential plaintiffs).
115. Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June 30, 2014).
116. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363
(2d Cir. 1973) (noting that federal securities law provides investors with
accurate corporate information).
117. Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate
Governance, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 10, 13 (2006) (arguing that investors will not
invest if they cannot rely on the accuracy of corporate disclosures).
118. Without § 13(b), investors would discount the prices they offer for the
shares of all companies to compensate for the risk that an individual company’s
financial information is inaccurate. See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions
that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 1567 (2000)
(“Investors don’t know which companies are truthful and which aren’t, so they
discount the prices they will offer for the shares of all companies.”). This ensures
that, “on average,” investors receive a fair value for the securities. Id. As a
result, investors can limit the effects of inaccurate financial records without
§ 13(b)’s protection.
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would not be justified from a cost–benefit perspective if it
included a private right of action, Congress provided that only the
SEC may bring § 13(b) claims.119
2. Materiality
Materiality is a gatekeeper in federal securities law.120 At its
core, materiality answers this question: Is an activity important
enough to regulate? Material information is important, so
regulators mandate its disclosure; nonmaterial information is
unimportant, so regulators do not mandate its disclosure.121
Mandating the disclosure of nonmaterial information would
provide little benefit to investors at a significant cost to public
companies.122
The seminal definition of materiality comes from TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.123 Information is material if
there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
[information] would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”124 In determining whether the reasonable investor
would consider information important, courts consider
quantitative factors, such as whether the information concerns
more than 5% of the company’s earnings, as well as qualitative

119. See, e.g., In re Remec Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (S.D.
Cal. 2005) (noting that § 13(b) does not contain a private right of action); Davis
v. DCB Fin. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 664, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (dismissing a
private suit for a violation of § 13(b)).
120. See James J. Park, Rule 10b–5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment
Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 377 (2010) (noting that materiality separates
important information from trivial information); Glenn F. Miller, Comment,
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the Murky
World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 368 (2000) (“Materiality
plays a critical gatekeeper role in the disclosure process under the federal
security laws.”).
121. See Park, supra note 120, at 377 (indicating that nonmaterial
information does not affect investment decisions).
122. See Miller, supra note 120, at 368 (arguing that such a requirement
would be “oppressively burdensome”).
123. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
124. Id. at 449.
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factors, such as whether the information concealed an unlawful
transaction or turned a loss into a profit.125
Materiality qualifies several provisions in the federal
securities law, including Rule 10b–5126 and § 11.127 Thus,
unimportant misrepresentations are not fraudulent under
Rule 10b–5, and inconsequential omissions in a registration
statement do not establish § 11 liability.128 But § 13(b) is qualified
by a standard of reasonableness.129 Consequently, § 13(b) reaches
unreasonable inaccuracy in corporate records even if these
inaccuracies are nonmaterial.130
There are two reasons for Congress’s exclusion of materiality from
§ 13(b). First, a lower standard of accuracy should strengthen § 13(b)’s
deterrent effect.131 As the Supreme Court stated in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson132 regarding Rule 10b–5:
Acknowledging that certain information concerning corporate
developments could well be of “dubious significance,” the Court [in
TSC Industries] was careful not to set too low a standard of
materiality; it was concerned that a minimal standard might bring
125. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 719 (2d Cir. 2011)
(stating that courts must consider both quantitative and qualitative factors in
determining materiality); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg.
45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 19, 1999) (listing several qualitative factors that courts
should consider in determining materiality).
126. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b) (2014) (making it unlawful to make any
untrue statement of “material fact” or to omit a “material fact” necessary to
make previous statements not misleading).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (providing liability for any untrue
statement or omission of a “material fact” contained in a registration
statement).
128. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448 (“[I]f the standard of materiality is
unnecessarily low, . . . the corporation and its management [may] be subjected
to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements . . . .”).
129. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 6 n.25 (noting that § 13(b) is
“qualified by the terms ‘in reasonable detail’ and ‘reasonable assurances,’ as
distinguished from the concept of materiality”).
130. See id. at 6 (noting that § 13(b) provides liability regardless of whether
the violation led to the dissemination of materially false information).
131. See S. REP NO. 95-114, at 7 (1977) (arguing that § 13(b) should deter
corporate bribery by increasing the accuracy of corporate financials); Christian
J. Mixter, Individual Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws for
Misstatements in Corporate SEC Filings, 56 BUS. LAW. 967, 985–86 (2001)
(noting that the SEC frequently brings § 13(b) claims because they do not
require proof of scienter).
132. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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an overabundance of information within its reach, and lead
management “simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of
trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking.”133

The Court thus acknowledged that management will take greater
precaution as the standard for liability decreases.134 Because “in
reasonable detail” is a lower standard than materiality, Congress
anticipated that companies would be more diligent in complying with
§ 13(b).135
Second, the concern that a lower threshold would bury investors in
an “avalanche of trivial information” is not present in § 13(b).136 Section
13(b) applies to corporate books and records, which are not disclosed to
investors in full.137 Instead, companies only disclose material financial
information.138 But by setting a higher bar at the front end (during
internal auditing) Congress ensures that companies disclose accurate,
material information.139 For these reasons, Congress concluded that
“standards of reasonableness” should apply.140
3. Scienter
Scienter is a state-of-mind requirement in various provisions
of federal securities law.141 The seminal definition of scienter
133. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
448–49 (1976)).
134. See id. (noting that too low a standard of materiality may lead to
overinclusive public disclosures).
135. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that § 13(b) provides
liability regardless of whether the violation led to the dissemination of
materially false information).
136. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012) (applying the “in reasonable detail”
standard to corporate “books, records, and accounts”).
138. See, e.g., id. § 77aa(a)(24) (requiring companies to disclose in the
registration statement information regarding every “material contract” made
outside the ordinary course of business).
139. See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and
Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 466–68 (2002) (noting that
Enron’s accounting fraud heightened the need for more demanding internal
audit controls and more precise SEC disclosures).
140. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (noting
that Rule 10b–5 requires proof of scienter); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014)
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comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,142 where the Court defined scienter as “a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”143 This
definition may be confusing given its circularity,144 but courts
have defined scienter in more identifiable terms: knowledge and
recklessness.
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court decided that negligence
was insufficient to establish § 10(b) liability.145 Section 10(b)
imposes liability for “manipulative” or “deceptive” conduct.146
According to the Court, these words contemplate a state of mind
greater than negligence.147 Instead, § 10(b) requires scienter.148 In
defining scienter, the Court cited favorably cases that described
scienter as “conscious fault.”149 That is, defendants act with
scienter when they have knowledge that their activities are
fraudulent.150
The Court in Hochfelder also acknowledged that recklessness
could constitute scienter in certain circumstances151 but refused
(providing liability for securities fraud).
142. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
143. Id. at 193 n.12.
144. What’s the requisite state of mind to commit fraud? It’s the intent to
commit fraud.
145. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 187–88 (stating that the issue before the
court was whether civil damages may lie for a § 10(b) violation in the absence of
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
147. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 (arguing that the text of § 10(b) implied
that Congress required more than mere negligence to establish liability).
148. See id. at 193 (concluding that § 10(b) requires more than mere
negligence).
149. See id. at 193 n.12 (noting that scienter refers to “a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud”); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting that Rule 10b–5 requires scienter or
“conscious fault”).
150. See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 2 (2009) (noting that scienter
generally refers to intent or knowledge of wrongdoing); William H. Kuehnle, On
Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 121, 123 (1997) (noting that direct knowledge of falseness can
constitute scienter under § 10(b)).
151. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (“In
certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.”).
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to decide this issue.152 While the Supreme Court has never ruled
on this issue, all circuits agree that recklessness can constitute
scienter.153 In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,154 the
Seventh Circuit defined recklessness as an “extreme departure”
from the standards of ordinary care to the point that the
defendant “must have been aware” of the fraud.155 Thus, scienter
can constitute either direct knowledge of the fraud156 or reckless
disregard of the fraud.157
It is well established that Rule 10b–5 requires scienter158
while § 11 does not.159 But the circuit courts are currently spilt on
whether § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 require scienter.160 The next
Part tackles this issue, arguing that neither of these provisions
include a scienter requirement.

152. See id. (“We need not address here the question whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under [§] 10(b)
and Rule 10b–5.”).
153. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (10th Cir.
1990) (“Our circuit, however, along with ten other circuits, has held that
recklessness may satisfy the element of scienter in a civil action for damages
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.”). Since the Hollinger decision, the Ninth Circuit
has likewise held that recklessness can constitute scienter in the Rule 10b–5
context. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“The plaintiffs may establish scienter by proving either actual knowledge or
recklessness.” (citing Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1568–69)). As a result, all circuits
include recklessness as a form of scienter.
154. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
155. Id. at 1045 (citation omitted); see also Kuehnle, supra note 150, at 122
(noting that courts often rely on the Sundstrand court’s definition of reckless
scienter).
156. See Kuehnle, supra note 150, at 123 (noting that direct knowledge of
falseness can constitute scienter under § 10(b)).
157. See Hollinger, 914 F.3d at 1568–69 (concluding that scienter includes
recklessness).
158. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (noting that
scienter is one of six requirements in a 10b–5 cause of action).
159. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)
(noting that a plaintiff “need only show a material misstatement or omission to
establish his prima facie case”). “Liability against the issuer of a security is
virtually absolute, even for innocent mistakes.” Id.
160. See infra Part III (arguing that § 13(b) does not require scienter).
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III. The Circuit Split
As we have seen, § 13(b) sweeps broadly, reaching all aspects
of corporate bookkeeping.161 And yet Congress and the courts
have placed strict limits on other provisions of securities law. 162
One way to limit the scope of § 13(b) would be to add a scienter
requirement, and, currently, the federal circuits are split on this
exact issue. Whereas the Ninth Circuit has found a scienter
requirement in Rule 13b2–2,163 the Second and Eighth Circuits
have held the opposite.164 This Part explores the circuit split,
arguing that, as a matter of law (and policy), § 13(b) does not (and
should not) contain a scienter requirement.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in SEC v. Todd
In SEC v. Todd, the SEC brought a Rule 13b2–2 claim165
against Jeffery Weitzen, former President and CEO of Gateway,
and John Todd and Robert Manza, former financial officers at
Gateway.166 The SEC alleged that Gateway made a series of
161. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the breadth of § 13(b) and Rule
13b2–2).
162. See supra Part II.C (comparing the scope of § 13(b) to Rule 10b–5 and
§ 11).
163. SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1220 (9th Cir. 2011).
164. SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943, 955 (8th Cir. 2013); SEC v. McNulty, 137
F.3d 732, 740–41 (2d Cir. 1998).
165. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1212. The SEC also brought a Rule 10b–5 action
against each defendant, and the issue before the court relating to Rule 10b–5
was whether the defendants acted with scienter. Id. at 1215–16. This raises a
question regarding whether the court confused Rule 10b–5, which requires
scienter, when deciding the Rule 13b2–2 issue. See id. at 1215 (noting that
Rule 10b–5 requires evidence of four things, one of which is scienter). While the
court reasoned that because the defendants acted with scienter regarding the
10b–5 claim, they likewise acted with scienter regarding the 13b2–2 claim, id. at
1220, this assumption does not resolve whether Rule 13b2–2 actually requires
scienter. See id. at 1219 (noting that the SEC argued that the lower court
“impermissibly grafted a scienter requirement” onto Rule 13b2–2). As discussed
later in this subpart, the court relies entirely on precedent to resolve this issue.
See infra notes 182–192 and accompanying text (noting that the Ninth Circuit
relies exclusively on a single case to support its conclusion that Rule 13b2–2
requires scienter).
166. Id. at 1212. The district court dismissed the Rule 13b2–2 against
Weitzen on summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision. Id.
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misleading statements designed to meet analysts’ quarterly
earnings expectations.167 In particular, the SEC claimed that
Gateway misled the market by booking three transactions
improperly: the Lockheed transaction, the VenServ transaction,
and the AOL transaction.
In the Lockheed transaction, Gateway recorded $42.7 million
in revenue from a sale of computer servers.168 Following the sale,
Lockheed leased the servers back to Gateway.169 This transaction
was odd because it was outside Gateway’s ordinary course of
business, which typically involves selling its own computers to
individual customers.170 The SEC claimed this transaction gave
Gateway a one-time boost in revenue to meet quarterly
expectations.171
In the VenServ transaction, Gateway booked $21 million in
revenue from incomplete computer sales.172 Under the sale
agreement, Venserv agreed to pay Gateway only after Gateway
referred a certain number of customers to Venserv.173 Gateway
did not reach the requisite number of referred customers but
nevertheless booked the revenue from the sale.174
In the AOL transaction, Gateway changed the payment
structure for its accounts receivable from AOL.175 Rather than
pay a fee when a customer registered for AOL on the Gateway
computer, AOL agreed to pay a fee when Gateway shipped the
computer to the customer.176 This allowed Gateway to book $72
million in fees sooner.177 While the transaction itself was not

167. Id. These misstatements masked a $110 million shortfall between
actual earnings and market expectations. Id. at 1213.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1213–14 (“[A]bsent the $47.2 million in revenue booked by
Gateway from the Lockheed transaction, Gateway would not have met analysts’
quarterly expectations.”).
172. Id. at 1214.
173. Id.
174. See id. (“None of the parties presently disputes the fact that the
VenServ sale was improperly booked.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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improper, Gateway misled analysts by referring to its revenue as
“accelerated” when it was based on this one-time transaction.178
The jury found Todd and Manza liable under Rule 13b2–2,
but the district court set aside the verdict.179 On appeal, the SEC
argued that the lower court improperly grafted a scienter
requirement onto Rule 13b2–2 in setting aside the verdict.180
While this rule does not create a strict liability regime, the SEC
contended, it creates a standard closer to negligence or
reasonableness.181 Relying exclusively on United States v.
Goyal,182 the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument: “The district
court properly applied a ‘knowing’ standard.”183
In Goyal, the defendant faced criminal prosecution for
making false statements to outside auditors.184 Under §§ 13(b)(4)
and 13(b)(5),185 the Government had to show that the defendant
“voluntarily made statements to [the outside auditor] that he
knew were false.”186 Because §§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5) contain a
scienter requirement, “[c]riminal liability under Rule 13b2–2
therefore also requires that a false statement to an auditor be
made knowingly.”187 Otherwise, Rule 13b2–2 would exceed the
scope of §§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5).188
In Todd, the SEC did not seek criminal liability against
Gateway’s officers;189 nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit read its
decision in Goyal to impose a scienter requirement even in civil
actions.190 Indeed, the court omitted the word “criminal” when
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1219.
181. See id. (arguing that the district court improperly grafted a scienter
requirement onto Rule 13b2–2).
182. 629 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010).
183. Todd, 642 F.3d at 1219.
184. Goyal, 629 F.3d at 913.
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)(4)–(5) (2012) (imposing criminal liability for
individuals who knowingly violate § 13(b)).
186. Goyal, 629 F.3d at 916.
187. Id. at 916 n.6 (emphasis added).
188. See id. (noting that the SEC cannot promulgate a rule that covers a
“broader swath” than the authorizing statute).
189. See SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
SEC brought claims under Rule 13b2–2 and not under §§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5)).
190. See id. (“To be liable, one must ‘knowingly’ make false statements.”).
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citing Goyal, writing “liability under Rule 13b2–2 . . . requires
that a false statement to an auditor be made knowingly.”191 And
the court’s analysis ended there. The court provided no other
support for the proposition that Rule 13b2–2 requires scienter for
civil liability. As discussed below, other sources, such as the text
of Rule 13b2–2 and § 13(b)’s legislative history, confirm that the
Ninth Circuit is plainly wrong.192
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision in SEC v. McNulty and the
Eighth Circuit’s Decision in SEC v. Das
The Second and Eighth Circuits have reached the opposite
conclusion, finding that Rule 13b2–2 does not require scienter.193
This subpart discusses SEC v. McNulty (Second Circuit) and SEC
v. Das (Eighth Circuit) in turn, highlighting the legislative
history of § 13(b) and the administrative history of Rule 13b2–2,
respectively.
1. SEC v. McNulty
Robert McNulty controlled several corporations, and from
1988–1990, he raised $78 million in public offerings.194 The SEC
brought a Rule 10b–5 claim against McNulty for diverting these
191. Compare Todd, 642 F.3d at 1219 (“[L]iability under Rule 13b2–2 . . . requires
that a false statement to an auditor be made knowingly.” (quoting United States v.
Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010))), with United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d
912, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Criminal liability under Rule 13b2–2 . . . requires that a
false statement to an auditor be made knowingly.” (emphasis added)).
192. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the Second and Eighth Circuits
concluded properly that Rule 13b2–2 does not contain a scienter requirement).
193. Two district courts in the Tenth Circuit have discussed the circuit split,
and each agreed with the Second and Eighth Circuit that § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2 do not require scienter. See SEC v. Kovzan, No. 11–2017–JWL,
2013 WL 5651401, at *15 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2013) (“The Court is persuaded by
the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in choosing a standard in Das.”); SEC v.
Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1214 (D.N.M. 2013) (“The Court finds the
Second Circuit’s interpretation of [R]ule 13b2–2(a) and (c) persuasive . . . .”).
Likewise, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has concluded that Rule 13b2–2 does not require scienter. SEC v.
Espuelas, 908 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
194. SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 734 (2d Cir. 1998).
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funds to himself and to other entities he controlled.195 The SEC
also brought a § 13(b) claim against John Shanklin, who
controlled the books and records for two of McNulty’s
companies.196 Shanklin did not file a response, and the district
court entered a default judgment in September 1995.197
Shanklin sought to set aside the default judgment, arguing
his lack of scienter constituted a defense to the Rule 13b2–2
claim.198 The court denied Shanklin’s motion, concluding that
§ 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 do not require scienter.199 The court
observed that § 13(b)(2) contains no words indicating a scienter
requirement.200 The court bolstered this reading with §§ 13(b)(4)
and 13(b)(5), which expressly require scienter for criminal
liability.201 This implied, the court concluded, that Congress did
not intend to require scienter for civil liability.202
The legislative history of § 13(b) confirms this reading.
Congress believed § 13(b)(2) would “operate in tandem with the
criminalization provisions” of §§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5).203 Those
provisions criminalize “conscious undertaking[s] to falsify
records.”204 As Congress noted: “The inclusion of this [knowingly]
standard is intended to be limited to matters arising under
195. See id. (noting that McNulty fraudulently concealed his intent to
misappropriate the funds). McNulty was dismissed as a defendant in return for
cooperating with the SEC’s investigation. SEC v. McNulty, No. 94 CIV. 7114
(MBM), 1996 WL 422259, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996).
196. See McNulty, 137 F.3d at 734 (claiming that Shanklin knew, or
recklessly failed to know, of McNulty’s fraudulent activities).
197. See id. at 734–35 (noting that the SEC reminded Shanklin to file an
answer on numerous occasions).
198. See id. at 738 (arguing that his lack of scienter provided a conclusive
defense necessary to overcome a default judgment).
199. See id. at 740–41 (“[S]cienter is not an element of civil claims under
[§ 13(b) or Rule 13b2–2].”).
200. See id. at 741 (arguing § 13(b)(2) does not require scienter); 1979 SEC
Release, supra note 18, at 10 (noting that the SEC did not add a scienter
requirement to Rule 13b2–2 because there is no scienter requirement in § 13(b)).
201. See SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
Congress amended § 13(b) to include criminal liability in 1988).
202. See id. (arguing that Congress could have included a scienter
requirement in § 13(b)(2) in 1988 when it added the knowingly standard to
§§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5)).
203. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 (1977).
204. Id. at 9.
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[§§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5)] and not to any other provisions of the
securities laws.”205 Thus, the legislative history shows that
scienter applies only to criminal actions under § 13(b).
2. SEC v. Das
Vinod Gupta “lived a life of luxury” while serving as CEO of
infoUSA, Inc., a publicly traded company.206 The founder and
leader of infoUSA billed the company for numerous personal
expenses, including private jet travel and upkeep on his eightyfoot yacht.207 By billing the company, Gupta received additional
benefits without paying additional income tax.208 While
management viewed this practice as acceptable,209 the SEC
viewed this practice as a violation of numerous provisions of
securities law.210
The SEC asserted claims against Rajnish Das and Stormy
Dean, former CFOs of infoUSA, under § 13(b)(2) and Rule 13b2–2
for failing to report the benefits given to Gupta.211 The district
court found in favor of the SEC on both counts.212 On appeal,
Dean challenged the jury instructions, which stated that Dean
violated Rule 13b2–2 if he acted unreasonably.213 Dean cited the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Todd, arguing that Rule 13b2–2
requires scienter.214
205. Id.
206. SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2013).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. (noting that management found this acceptable because Gupta
was the driving force behind the company’s success).
210. See id. at 946–47 (bringing seven causes of action against executives of
infoUSA). The SEC brought claims under the following provisions of the ’34 Act:
§ 10(b) (committing securities fraud); § 14(a) (filing false proxy statements);
§ 13(b)(5) (falsifying books and records); Rule 13a–14 (certifying false reports);
Rule 13b2–2 (deceiving outside auditors); § 13(a) (aiding and abetting); and
§ 13(b)(2) (aiding and abetting). Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 947 (noting that jury needed only a “few hours” of
deliberation to convict Das and Dean of all seven charges).
213. See id. at 954 (arguing that the SEC was required to prove that the
defendants acted “knowingly”).
214. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, relying on the
text of § 13(b) and the administrative history of Rule 13b2–2. As
to the text of § 13(b), the court noted that the knowingly standard
applies exclusively to criminal liability under § 13(b)(5).215
Accordingly, grafting scienter onto § 13(b)(2) would conflict with
the plain language of the statute. As to the administrative history
of Rule 13b2–2, the court noted that the SEC interprets
Rule 13b2–2 to not require scienter,216 and the court deferred to
the SEC’s interpretation of its own rule.217
The court also criticized the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Todd.218 The court noted that the Ninth Circuit relied on a
criminal case for the proposition that § 13(b) requires scienter.219
And reading the scienter requirement in § 13(b)(5) to apply to
Rule 13b2–2 would destroy the dichotomy between criminal and
civil liability.220 Such an argument, the court highlighted,
“ignores that Rule 13b2–2 was promulgated pursuant to section
13(b)(2), not (b)(5).”221 According to the Eighth Circuit, the “plain
language of the statute” is clear—criminal liability requires
scienter but civil liability does not.222
C. The Policy Rationale for Excluding Scienter from Rule 13b2–2
The SEC had valid reasons for excluding scienter from
Rule 13b2–2. First and foremost, the SEC recognized that
215. See id. (noting that any analysis of statutory interpretation should
begin with the plain language of the statute).
216. See id. at 956 (noting that Rule 13b2–2 was promulgated under
§ 13(b)(2), which does not require scienter, and not under § 13(b)(5), which
requires scienter); 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 12 (interpreting
Rule 13b2–2 to not include a scienter requirement).
217. See Das, 723 F.3d at 956 (“[I]t is well established that an agency’s
construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” (quoting
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150
(1991))).
218. See id. at 955 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit concluded improperly
that § 13(b)(5)’s scienter requirement also applied to § 13(b)(2)).
219. See id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit misquoted Goyal).
220. See id. at 955–56 (“[C]riminal liability trigger’s § 13(b)(5)’s ‘knowing’
requirement . . . indicating that it is otherwise not an element of a civil claim.”).
221. Id. at 956.
222. Id. at 955.

930

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2015)

including scienter in Rule 13b2–2 would be inconsistent with
congressional intent.223 According to the SEC, Congress excluded
scienter from § 13(b)(2) by providing “no words indicating” an
intent to include scienter while expressly providing a scienter
requirement in § 13(b)(5).224 Accordingly, including scienter in
Rule 13b2–2 would frustrate congressional intent.225
In addition, the SEC believed that excluding scienter would
facilitate the detection of corporate fraud and bribery.226
Consultation with outside auditors frequently results in the
detection of “material weaknesses” in auditing controls.227 The
SEC did not believe that these weaknesses were inadvertent;
instead, the SEC noted that the presence of weak internal audit
controls was “almost universal” in corporate fraud and bribery
cases.228 The SEC believed Rule 13b2–2 would help auditors
detect flaws in accounting controls and thereby illuminate
instances of corporate impropriety.229 Thus, Rule 13b2–2 would
further the primary goal of the FCPA by deterring corporate
bribery.230
The SEC also concluded that Rule 13b2–2 would serve the
FCPA’s secondary goal of affirming investor confidence in
corporate disclosures.231 While outside auditors frequently detect
flaws in the internal audit controls, their primary objective is to

223. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 10 (noting that including
scienter “would be inconsistent with the language” of § 13(b)).
224. Id.
225. See id. (“It would be anomalous, under these circumstances, to include
a ‘scienter’ requirement in the new Rule.”).
226. See id. at 12 (arguing that officers and directors often mislead outside
accounts to hide illegal or improper payments).
227. Id. at 11.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 6 (arguing that Rule 13b2–2 is necessary and appropriate to
carrying out § 13(b)’s policy goals).
230. See id. at 4 (“The primary impetus for the enactment of the FCPA arose
from disclosures of widespread corporate bribery.”); Anupam Chander, Googling
Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36 (2011) (noting that Congress expressed a
“moral interest in condemning corruption” when passing the FCPA).
231. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 (1977) (“Public confidence in securities
markets will be enhanced by assurance that corporate recordkeeping is
honest.”); Chander, supra note 230, at 36 (noting that the FCPA enhanced our
“free enterprise system” by protecting the integrity of corporate disclosures).
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verify
corporate
financials.232
By
encouraging
honest
communication between corporate actors and outside auditors,
Rule 13b2–2 should increase the auditors’ ability to detect
inaccuracies.233 As a result, the SEC concluded that Rule 13b2–2
would further both goals of the FCPA.
The SEC recognized, nonetheless, that excluding scienter
from Rule 13b2–2 would impose significant costs on public
companies. In particular, the SEC recognized that strict
compliance with § 13(b) would be virtually impossible given the
daily volume of transactions for large corporations.234 As a result,
officers and directors cannot guarantee that comments made to
outside auditors are perfectly accurate.235 This uncertainty could
result in less candid communication as officers may shield
themselves from unknowingly violating the rule.236 In addition,
the SEC acknowledged that this rule may subject certain goodfaith actors to personal liability.237
Ultimately, the SEC concluded that the benefits of Rule 13b2–2
outweighed its costs.238 The SEC downplayed the effect of
excluding scienter, arguing that the “in reasonable detail”
language would protect individuals who commit inadvertent or
minor mistakes.239 Even if Rule 13b2–2 was not so limited, the
SEC concluded that the need to deter corporate impropriety was

232. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that auditors review
a company’s internal audit controls primarily to understand the scope and
nature of the examination into the accuracy of the company’s financials).
233. See id. (arguing that Rule 13b2–2 will deter inaccurate corporate
financials).
234. See id. at 9 (discussing comments raised by concerned parties that large
corporations would not be able to comply with Rule 13b2–2 without a scienter
requirement).
235. See id. (noting that many commenters believed violations of
Rule 13b2–2 would be “inevitable”).
236. See id. at 12 (noting that many comments expressed concerns that
chilling communication would impede an auditor’s evaluation of the
corporation).
237. See id. at 9 (noting that many comments argued that Rule 13b2–2
would impose liability unfairly on innocent actors).
238. See id. at 12 (deciding that the advantages of Rule 13b2–2 outweigh the
disadvantages mentioned by several commenters).
239. See id. at 10 (noting that the rule does not require perfection in
corporate recordkeeping).
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important enough to justify exacting liability on innocent actors.240
Relying conclusively on “its experience” in handling corporate
accounting issues, the SEC’s position is clear: “[T]he Commission
has decided that the advantages of the new Rule outweigh the
potential disadvantages suggested by certain commentators.”241
But the SEC failed to consider an alternative—an alternative
that would limit the scope of § 13(b) while advancing the SEC’s
policy goals. The next Part argues that the SEC can better protect
corporate actors by including a due diligence defense in § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2. Such protection would allay the concerns expressed
by many commenters while better aligning the costs and benefits
of these provisions with Congress’s and the SEC’s policy goals.
IV. Grafting a Due Diligence Defense onto § 13(b)
and Rule 13b2–2
This Note has highlighted a single, basic tension: § 13(b)
sweeps broadly to ensure accurate financial disclosures,242 and yet
concerns of overly broad prosecution permeate any analysis of
federal securities law.243 The question becomes how can we
balance these two concerns? This Part argues that a due diligence
defense would both limit § 13(b) and enhance the accuracy of
financial disclosure. To understand this proposal fully, we must
first analyze the due diligence defense under § 11244 as well as
highlight characteristics that make § 13(b) amenable to a due
diligence defense.245

240. See id. at 12 (arguing that the benefits of Rule 13b2–2 outweigh its
cost).
241. Id.
242. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the breadth of § 13(b)).
243. See supra Part II.C (discussing the many ways in which Congress and
the courts limit certain provisions of securities law).
244. Infra Part IV.A.
245. Infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Due Diligence Defense Under § 11
Section 11 provides liability for material misstatements or
omissions in a registration statement.246 There are a few
affirmative defenses,247 the most significant of which is the due
diligence defense. The due diligence defense allows defendants
who act reasonably, as opposed to intentionally or recklessly, to
escape liability.248 This defense, however, is not available to the
issuer.249
The due diligence defense is a composite of two defenses: the
“reasonable reliance” defense and the “reasonable investigation”
defense.250 The applicability of these defenses depends on the
portion of the registration statement at issue and the individual
defendant.251 The reasonable reliance defense is available only to
nonexperts working with expertised portions of the registration
statement.252 In these circumstances, nonexperts can establish a
due diligence defense by showing they had “no reasonable ground
to believe and did not believe” that the expertised portion of the
registration statement was misleading.253 In essence, this defense
allows nonexperts to rely on the work of experts.254 The
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (providing liability for materially
misleading registration statements).
247. See id. (providing that liability will arise unless the purchaser of the
security knew of the material misstatement or omission at the time of
purchase); id. § 77k(e) (providing that damages may be reduced to the extent the
defendant shows that the plaintiff’s injury arose from causes other than a
misleading registration statement).
248. See David I. Michaels, No Fraud? No Problem: Outside Director
Liability for Shelf Offerings Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 26
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 345, 364 (2007) (arguing that the due diligence
defense allows defendants to avoid liability by “(dis)proving scienter”).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (stating that no person “other than the issuer”
who establishes a due diligence defense shall be liable under § 11).
250. Michaels, supra note 248, at 366.
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (distinguishing between expertised and
nonexpertised portions of the registration statement and between experts and
nonexperts).
252. See id. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (applying the defense to any part of the
registration statement “made on the authority of an expert”).
253. Id.
254. See John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005, 1010 (1981) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (noting that this defense is available because “by definition” it is
reasonable to rely on the veracity of an expert’s work).
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reasonable investigation defense adds an additional requirement
in two circumstances: (1) where an expert works with an
expertised portion of the registration statement;255 or (2) where a
nonexpert works with a nonexpertised portion of the registration
statement.256 These individuals must conduct a reasonable
investigation into the accuracy of the registration statement.257
This raises a question: what constitutes a “reasonable”
investigation or belief? The statute provides some answer: “[T]he
standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent
man in the management of his own property.”258 This provision
provides little guidance because it is “exceedingly vague.”259 The
SEC attempted to provide greater clarity with Rule 176, which
lists eight factors relevant to determining the reasonableness of
an investigation.260 But this rule is essentially useless because
most of the factors, such as the “type of issuer” or the “type of
person,” are so obvious that courts would likely consider these
factors without the rule’s guidance.261
255. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (2012).
256. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A).
257. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A)–(B). For example, an accountant compiling a
company’s audited financials is an expert working with an expertised portion of
a registration statement. See John Nuveen & Co., 450 U.S. at 1010 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (noting that certified accountants are experts regarding the portions
of the registration statement on which they work). Thus, the accountant would
have to investigate the accuracy of the audited financials to qualify for a due
diligence defense. A nonaccountant working with the same material would
likely be a nonexpert working with an expertised portion of the registration
statement. As such, the nonaccountant, relying on the accountant’s expertise in
compiling the audited financials, can establish a due diligence defense without
investigating the accuracy of those financials.
258. Id. § 77k(c).
259. David I. Michaels, An Empirical Study of Securities Litigation After
Worldcom, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 319, 331 (2009); see Stephen P. Ferris et al., An
Analysis and Recommendation for Prestigious Underwriter Participation in
IPOs, 17 J. CORP. L. 581, 588 (1992) (noting that companies prefer experienced
underwriters given the vague reasonableness standard in the due diligence
defense).
260. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2014) (listing, among others, “the type of
issuer,” “type of security,” and “type of person” as relevant factors).
261. See Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning
Underwriters’ Continuous Due Diligence After WorldCom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2001, 2022 (2009) (noting that Rule 176 does not provide underwriters with
“iron-clad” steps to avoid § 11 liability); William K. Sjostrom Jr., The Due
Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS
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The case law provides some help in this regard. The
formative case involving the due diligence defense is Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp.262 There, the court employed a caseby-case approach, assessing the validity of each defendant’s due
diligence claim based on the specific facts relating to each
defendant.263 Nevertheless, this case shows that senior managers
are less likely to avoid liability because it is unreasonable to be
ignorant of the misleading registration statement given their
positions in the company.264
The Southern District of New York shed greater light on this
analysis in In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation.265 The
court decided that individuals cannot claim due diligence where
“red flags” give notice that the company may be engaged in
“wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.”266 Under this
analysis, even nonexperts can be liable if expertised portions of
the registration statement contain red flags.267 The court’s
primary concern related to underwriters, who are nonexperts
despite their financial sophistication. Worried that underwriters
may turn a “blind” eye to inaccurate financials, the court stated
that “mere reliance” on audited financials would not ward off
liability.268 Instead, underwriters, as nonexperts, must
investigate red flags in expertised portions of the registration
statement.269
L.J. 549, 571 (2006) (arguing that Rule 176 merely illustrated the SEC’s opinion
on the reasonableness of investigations).
262. 283 F. Supp. 643, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
263. See id. at 684–701 (noting that the plaintiffs brought § 11 claims
against the corporation, one controller of the corporation, nine directors, eight
underwriters, and the corporation’s outside auditor).
264. See id. at 684 (“[The CEO] knew all the relevant facts. He could not
have believed that there were no untrue statements or material omissions. . . .
[He] has no due diligence defenses.”); Sjostrom, supra note 261, at 575 (“[I]nside
directors/management defendants will face a difficult task in meeting the
reasonable investigation standard.”).
265. See 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (addressing a due
diligence defense advanced by WorldCom’s underwriter).
266. Id. at 672.
267. See id. 671–72 (noting that the red flag analysis should apply to
underwriters even though they are nonexperts when working with corporate
books and records).
268. Id.
269. See id. (finding that an investigation is not reasonable where a
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To summarize, the due diligence defense allows reasonable
actors to avoid liability.270 Some defendants must show that they
had no reasonable grounds to believe that the registration
statement was misleading;271 other defendants must hold the
same belief after a reasonable investigation into the veracity of
the registration statement.272 While case law provides some
answers regarding the reasonableness of an investigation or
belief,273 “no bright lines can be drawn.”274 Instead, this is
inherently a case-by-case determination.275
B. Similarities Between § 11 and § 13(b)
There are two similarities between § 11 and § 13(b) that
make § 13(b) amenable to a due diligence defense: both are
limited in scope;276 and both are plaintiff friendly.277 This subpart
discusses these similarities in turn.
Section 11 and § 13(b) apply to a limited number of actors.
There are only five potential defendants under § 11:
defendant ignores red flags that indicate corporate fraud).
270. See Michaels, supra note 248, at 364 (noting that defendants may prove
due diligence by “(dis)proving scienter”).
271. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (2012) (applying this standard to
nonexperts working with expertised portions of the registration statement).
272. See id. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (requiring nonexperts working with nonexpertised
portions of the registration statement to conduct a reasonable investigation); id.
§ 77k(b)(3)(B) (requiring experts working with expertised portions of the
registration statement to conduct a reasonable investigation).
273. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 672 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (requiring individuals to investigate “red flags” in the registration
statement); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 684–701
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (illustrating that it is more difficult for senior management to
make out a due diligence defense).
274. Sjostrom, supra note 261, at 609.
275. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 684–701 (applying the due diligence defense
to the facts relating to each individual defendant).
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5) (limiting potential defendants under § 11
to five classes of persons); id. § 78m(b) (applying to misstatements or omissions
in corporate books and records).
277. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)
(noting that “liability against the issuer of a security [under Section 11] is
virtually absolute, even for innocent mistakes”); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012)
(requiring companies to keep books and records accurate to a reasonable detail).
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(1) signatories of the registration statement; (2) directors or
partners at the time of filing; (3) persons named in the
registration statement as being or about to become a director or
partner; (4) certain experts who worked on the registration
statement; and (5) underwriters.278 Likewise, only the issuer and
those who work with financial records can be liable under
§ 13(b).279
Nevertheless, there is a key difference between the
underlying activities governed by these provisions. Section 11
governs registration statements, where the bulk of the work is
done by a “working group” consisting of senior executives, outside
counsel, outside auditors, and the underwriter.280 It is more
difficult for these high-level corporate actors to establish a due
diligence defense because it is less reasonable for them to be
ignorant of the misleading statements.281 But because corporate
bookkeepers must account for thousands of transactions a day,282
compliance with § 13(b) requires the diligence of more junior
employees.283 That is, junior employees are more likely to work on
corporate accounting than they are to work on a registration
statement. As a result, the due diligence defense may provide a
greater shield in the § 13(b) context.
A greater shield appears appropriate considering the causes
of action under § 11 and § 13(b). While both provisions are
plaintiff friendly,284 § 11 requires materiality whereas individuals
278. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5).
279. See id. § 78m(b)(2) (noting that § 13(b) applies to every reporting
issuer); id. § 78m(b)(4)–(5) (providing criminal liability for knowingly violating
§ 13(b)).
280. Sjostrom, supra note 261, at 556.
281. See id. at 575 (“[I]nside directors/management defendants will face a
difficult task in meeting the reasonable investigation standard.”); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 684 (1968) (“[The CEO] knew all the
relevant facts. He could not have believed that there were no untrue statements
or material omissions. . . . [He] has no due diligence defenses”).
282. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 9 (addressing the concern that
the volume of daily transactions for large corporations would make compliance
with § 13(b) nearly impossible).
283. See Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based
Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1,
69 (2011) (noting that complying with § 13(b) “necessarily enlists a range of
secondary participants, such as other employees and outside auditors”).
284. See supra Part III.C.1 (comparing the scope of liability under § 11 and
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can be liable under § 13(b) where their actions result in
nonmaterial inaccuracies in corporate financials.285 As a result,
§ 13(b) not only reaches more corporate employees but also is
easier to prove than a § 11 violation. Thus, corporate employees
may need greater protection from § 13(b) liability.
C. The Due Diligence Defense as Applied to § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2
As discussed above, a due diligence defense protects
reasonable actors from liability, and such a defense may be
appropriate in the § 13(b) context as a violation by mid- and
lower-level employees is relatively easy to prove. Now, this
subpart provides specific language applying a due diligence
defense to § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 before discussing the benefits
of such a proposal.
The proposed language would be inserted as clauses (i) and
(ii) to § 13(b)(2)(A) and read as follows:
(i) No person, other than the issuer, shall be liable under
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph who shall sustain the
burden of proof that he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe that the books,
records, and accounts accurately and fairly reflected, in
reasonable detail, the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer.
(ii) A person does not have reasonable ground to believe that
the books, records, and accounts accurately and fairly
reflected, in reasonable detail, the assets and dispositions of
the issuer solely by reason of the issuer having a system of
internal accounting controls required by subparagraph (B) of
this paragraph.

Clause (i) follows the format of § 11. The relevant portion of
§ 11 begins with the language of the due diligence defense: “[W]ho
shall sustain the burden of proof that . . . he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
§ 13(b)).
285. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that § 13(b) provides
liability regardless of whether the violation led to the dissemination of
materially false information).
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believe . . . .”286 Section 11 then applies this language to the
inverse of § 11’s core prohibition:287 “[T]hat the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission . . . necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading . . . .”288 Likewise,
this proposal applies the due diligence language to the inverse of
§ 13(b)(2)(A)’s prohibition:289 “[T]hat the books, records, and
accounts accurately and fairly reflected, in reasonable detail, the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” This
should apply the same due diligence defense to both § 11 and
§ 13(b)(2)(A).
This proposal omits § 11’s distinctions between experts and
nonexperts and between expertised and nonexpertised portions of
the registration statement. Presumably, bookkeepers have
extensive experience in corporate accounting. As a result, this
proposal uses the reasonable investigation defense under § 11,
effectively treating bookkeepers as experts working with
expertised material.290 Nevertheless, corporate bookkeepers may
rely on internal audit controls. Compared to § 11, therefore,
bookkeepers may be the nonexperts and the internal audit
controls may be the experts. As a result, it is possible to apply the
reasonable reliance defense to § 13(b), allowing bookkeepers to
rely on internal audit controls. Clause (ii) of the proposal
forecloses this possibility because it could render the due
diligence defense meaningless. Under clause (i), a defendant
could argue that he had reasonable ground to believe the books
and records were accurate because the issuer had internal audit
controls designed to ensure accurate books and records. Because
issuers are required to have these controls,291 this could
effectively remove the due diligence defense from § 13(b)(2)(A).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2012).
287. See id. § 77k(a) (prohibiting a registration statement from containing
an “untrue statement of material fact or [an omission] . . . necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading”).
288. Id. § 77k(a)(b)(3).
289. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (requiring reporting issuers to “make and keep
books, records and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions . . . of the issuer”).
290. See id. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (requiring experts working with expertised
portions to conduct a reasonable investigation into the veracity of that portion of
the registration statement).
291. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (requiring internal accounting controls).
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While allowing this argument to bear some weight, clause (ii)
would not allow this argument to serve as the sole basis of
establishing a due diligence defense.
This proposal would also require the SEC to add language to
Rule 13b2–2. Inserted as paragraph (3) of subsection (a),292 the
operative language would read as follows:
No director or officer of an issuer shall be liable under this
subsection who shall sustain the burden of proof that he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe
and did believe that any statements made to an accountant in
connection with any action listed under subparagraph (i) or (ii)
of paragraph (2) of this subsection were true and did not omit
any material fact required to be stated therein to make the
statements not misleading.

This language follows the same formula discussed earlier: the due
diligence language is applied to the inverse of Rule 13b2–2’s core
prohibition.293
To understand this proposal fully, it is useful to note what
would not change under § 13(b). Similar to § 11, the issuer would
not be able to claim due diligence.294 The SEC could enforce a
violation of § 13(b) against a company even if its employees acted
reasonably in keeping the books and records. Likewise, this
proposal would not affect §§ 13(b)(4) and 13(b)(5), which
292. Subsection (a) prohibits officers and directors from making materially
misleading statements or omissions in connection with any outside audit or SEC
filing. Subsection (b) prohibits officers and directors from taking any action to
“coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence” outside auditors into
rendering the issuer’s financial statements materially misleading. A due
diligence defense makes little sense here because the words “coerce, manipulate,
mislead, or fraudulently influence” necessarily require intentional action. A
violation of this subsection would never be reasonable under the due diligence
defense. Subsection (c) imposes the same requirements of subsections (a) and (b)
on specific categories of companies. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2–2(c) (2014)
(applying Rule 13b2–2 to investment companies and business development
companies). Presumably, the proposal could apply to this subsection as well, but
that is beyond the scope of this Note.
293. See id. § 240.13b2–2(a) (prohibiting officers and directors from making
materially misleading misstatements or omissions to outside auditors). The
language “no officer or director” is used here because Rule 13b2–2 uses the same
language. Id.
294. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)
(“Liability against the issuer of a security [under § 11] is virtually absolute, even
for innocent misstatements.”).
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authorize civil and criminal actions against individuals who
knowingly violate § 13(b).295 Finally, the due diligence defense
would not apply to the internal audit controls required by
§ 13(b)(2)(B).296 As discussed in detail in the next Part, these
retained aspects help justify the proposal on cost–benefit
grounds.
D. Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Due Diligence Defense in § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2
A cost–benefit analysis asks whether the costs of an action
exceed its benefits.297 This is the “basic tool” of regulation, which
seeks to reduce the costs of harmful behavior.298 Such analysis
cannot be performed in a vacuum, however. It is important to
note that an overriding goal of corporate law in general, and
federal securities law in particular, is to deter corporate
impropriety.299 Thus, this subpart begins by discussing briefly
some basic cost–benefit principles in the corporate context before
analyzing how a due diligence defense would both decrease the
costs and increase the benefits of corporate accounting regulation.
1. Cost–Benefit Principles in the Corporate Context
As stated earlier, corporate law seeks to deter corporate
impropriety. Deterrence occurs where the perceived costs of an
action exceed the perceived benefits.300 That is, a person will not
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(5) (2012) (imposing criminal liability for
knowing violations of § 13(b)).
296. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (requiring issuers to implement internal audit
controls designed to protect the accuracy of its books and records).
297. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 13.8, at 402 (7th
ed. 2007) (noting that a cost–benefit analysis is a method of determining
whether a course of action is advisable).
298. Id.; see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost–Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1651, 1656–67 (2001) (noting that there has been greater emphasis on
cost–benefit principles in the regulatory context since the 1970s).
299. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (noting that Congress intended
§ 13(b) to deter corporate bribery of foreign officials).
300. See POSNER, supra note 297, § 7.2, at 219 (discussing optimal criminal
sentencing from a deterrence perspective).
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perform an action if that person believes the costs outweigh the
benefits.301 Regulators can deter certain action by making its
costs exceed its benefits.302 To increase costs, regulators must
consider two variables: the likelihood of apprehension and the
penalty. Under the rational actor theory, an individual
considering the cost of violating a regulation will discount the
expected penalty by the probability of getting caught.303 To deter
violations, regulators must ensure that the expected punishment,
when discounted by the likelihood of conviction, exceeds the
benefit of noncompliance.304 For instance, suppose a corporate
officer would earn $1 million by sidestepping a regulation, and
the officer believes there is a 50% chance that she will be fined for
this action. The regulation would deter the officer if the fine
exceeds $2 million because, in theory, only a fine over $2 million
would negate the expected gain.
The corporate form adds a wrinkle to this equation. Because
the corporation is a person only in the legal sense, the entity
itself cannot be deterred.305 Instead, regulators focus on deterring
the corporation’s agents.306 But many of these agents, particularly
at the highest level, are judgment proof due to liability insurance
and exculpatory clauses.307 Imposing liability on judgment-proof
individuals provides little deterrence because these individuals
expect little-to-no punishment.308 As a result, regulators deter
301. See id. (arguing that punishing crimes too severely is inefficient).
302. See id. § 13.8, at 402 (noting that regulators consider the cost and
benefits of a given action when crafting regulations).
303. See John C. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 389 (1981) (“[T]he expected penalty must be discounted by the
likelihood of apprehension and conviction in order to yield the expected
punishment cost.”).
304. See id. (noting that an actor will only be deterred from a given action
where the expected punishment exceeds the expected benefit).
305. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1494 (1996) (noting that this fact may make
corporate liability appear incompatible with deterrence).
306. See id. (“In reality, the law aims to deter the unlawful acts or omissions
of a corporation’s agents.”).
307. See id. at 1495 (arguing that regulation will deter judgment-proof
individuals less than individuals who are not judgment proof).
308. See Coffee, supra note 303, at 389 (noting that greater punishments
should have greater deterrent effect).
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corporate agents indirectly by holding the corporation itself
liable.309
The goal of § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2 is to deter improper
corporate accounting practices and to increase the accuracy of
financial records. In drafting § 13(b) and in promulgating
Rule 13b2–2, therefore, Congress and the SEC presumably
concluded that the threat of liability exceeded the potential
benefits of violating these provisions.310 Assuming this is true, we
arrive at the question at hand: Can we improve the regulation of
corporate bookkeeping by reducing its costs and maintaining or
increasing its deterrence? That is, can we deter at a lower cost?
The due diligence defense would accomplish this goal.
2. Reducing the Costs of § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2
This proposal would reduce the costs of § 13(b) and
Rule 13b2–2 in two ways. First, it would reduce compliance
costs.311 Second, these provisions as currently constructed may
impose overdeterrence costs—they may cause companies to take
excessive precautions that add little marginal value to the
accuracy of corporate records. This proposal would reduce such
overdeterrence costs as well.312
a. Cost of Compliance
As Congress recognized,313 § 13(b) imposes significant costs
on public companies.314 Compliance requires “elaborate and
309. See Khanna, supra note 305, at 1495 (“Probably the best reason for
relying on corporate liability over direct liability is that corporate agents are
often judgment-proof.”).
310. See id. at 3 (arguing that § 13(b) should deter corporate bribery of
foreign officials).
311. Infra Part IV.D.2.a.
312. Infra Part IV.D.2.b.
313. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (1977) (recognizing that the benefits of
§ 13(b) must be weighed against the cost of implementing internal audit
controls).
314. See Note, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: An Alternative Perspective on SEC Intervention in Corporate Governance, 89
YALE L.J. 1573, 1576 (1980) (noting that § 13(b) forces management to construct
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expensive” internal audit controls315 as well as the work of
numerous employees.316 In addition, litigation and investigation
expenses can be extensive given the complexity of evaluating a
company’s internal accounting procedures.317 These costs have
only increased with the expanded investigatory powers given to
the SEC by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.318
To put these costs in perspective, a helpful comparison can be
drawn to the new internal auditing requirements implemented by
Sarbanes–Oxley. Section 404 of the Act instructs the SEC to
promulgate rules requiring companies to discuss the state of their
internal auditing controls in their annual report.319 Among other
things, SEC rules require a statement concerning the general
effectiveness of the internal audit controls.320 Because these rules
require an annual assessment of internal audit controls, section
404 imposes “substantial costs” on businesses.321 According to a
2009 SEC Report, medium-sized companies, defined as those with
a market capitalization between $75 million and $700 million,
spent $1 million annually to comply with section 404.322 Larger
companies faced nearly four times the cost.323 This comparison is
“elaborate and expensive control systems”).
315. Id.
316. See Franco, supra note 283, at 69 (noting that complying with § 13(b)
“necessarily enlists a range of secondary participants, such as other employees
and outside auditors”).
317. See Tyco Int’l Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 30, 2002) (noting
that Tyco’s internal investigation of possible accounting violations required 25
lawyers and 100 accountants, totaling approximately 15,000 lawyer hours and
50,000 accountant hours).
318. See Pearson & Mark, supra note 6, at 53 (“Expansive internal
investigations are often required to prepare for potential external investigations
by the SEC . . . .”).
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (requiring the SEC to promulgate rules
governing annual reports of internal audit controls).
320. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3) (2014) (requiring “management’s
assessment” of the effectiveness of internal audit controls).
321. Peter Ferola, Internal Controls in the Aftermath of Sarbanes–Oxley:
One Size Doesn’t Fit All, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87, 96 (2006).
322. See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC, STUDY OF SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF
2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
46–47 tbl.9 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf
(noting that internal labor was the greatest compliance cost followed closely by
outside audit expenses).
323. See id. (noting that companies with a public float over $700 million
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not exact; the cost of complying with section 404 may differ from
the cost of complying with § 13(b). Nevertheless, the high cost
associated with section 404 illustrates the expansive scope of
internal audit controls. As a result, it likely that the cost of
complying with § 13(b) is in the same ballpark.
This proposal should reduce compliance costs in two
significant ways. First, this proposal should increase
management’s ability to adopt more cost-efficient means of
compliance. Congress recognized that giving management
flexibility was the most efficient way to reduce the costs of
implementing § 13(b)’s requirements.324 Congress included the “in
reasonable detail” language to allow management flexibility in
complying with § 13(b).325 This proposal should increase
flexibility because it provides additional protection by eliminating
liability where bookkeepers act reasonably. As a result, managers
and bookkeepers should be more comfortable in choosing less
costly accounting procedures.
This argument bears directly on the second way this proposal
would reduce business costs. As the Supreme Court noted in
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, increasing the scope of liability should
increase the precaution corporations take to avoid liability.326
Conversely, corporations should take less precaution where the
scope of liability is lower. This makes sense from a deterrence
standpoint. Providing additional protection from liability should
decrease the perceived likelihood of conviction.327 As a result, the
proposal should lessen § 13(b)’s deterrent effect,328 and corporate
faced nearly $4 million in annual compliance costs).
324. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 8 (1977) (recognizing that “management
must necessarily estimate and evaluate the cost/benefit” of implementing
§ 13(b)’s requirements).
325. See id. (“Here, standards of reasonableness must apply.”).
326. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (arguing that
setting the standard of materiality too low in the Rule 10b–5 context would
result in companies flooding investors with an overabundance of trivial
information in an attempt to avoid liability).
327. See Malcom E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law
Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability
Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 929 (1989) (noting that the minimum
punishment needed to deter a certain action depends on the actor’s expected
cost and benefits of committing that action).
328. See POSNER, supra note 297, § 7.2, at 219 (arguing that deterrence
occurs where the perceived costs of a particular action surpass the perceived
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actors should take less precaution (and thereby incur less cost) in
ensuring accurate books and records.
A skeptic would argue that this proposal could lead to less
accurate books and records. As corporations take less precaution
in accounting procedures, the probability of inaccurate books and
records should increase. Consequently, decreasing § 13(b)’s
deterrent effect may result in more inaccurate bookkeeping. Such
an argument fails in two ways.
First, this proposal should better enable outside auditors to
detect flaws in internal auditing procedures by facilitating
communication with corporate executives. As expressed by many
commenters, Rule 13b2–2 may chill communication between
auditors and corporate actors.329 This also makes sense from a
deterrence standpoint. Because individuals can be liable for
unknowingly violating the rule, the chance of apprehension and
conviction is high. In response, individuals may limit
communication with outside auditors to limit liability
exposure.330
Under this proposal, individuals could take reasonable steps
at the front end to ensure that the information divulged to
accountants is accurate. Individuals could then communicate this
information without fear of liability. By facilitating
communication, this proposal would better serve the two aims of
the FCPA. First, it would better enable outside auditors to detect
flaws in internal audit controls, thus increasing the efficiency of
accounting procedures.331 Second, it would better illuminate
instances of corporate impropriety by increasing the auditor’s
ability to detect inaccuracies in corporate financials.332
Thus the first response to the skeptic’s argument is that this
proposal presents a trade-off. On one hand, the skeptic’s concern
benefits).
329. See 1979 SEC Release, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that many
commenters believed that excluding scienter from Rule 13b2–2 would impede
frank communication between auditors and the corporation).
330. See id. (noting that many commenters argued that including a scienter
requirement in Rule 13b2–2 would also facilitate communication).
331. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 7 (1977) (arguing that § 13(b) should increase
“public confidence in securities markets” by ensuring that “corporate
recordkeeping is honest”).
332. See id. at 3 (arguing that inaccurate books and records facilitate
corporate impropriety by disguising the financial effect of fraud and bribery).
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may be valid: as corporate actors take less precaution, corporate
books and records may be less accurate. Put another way, this
proposal may devalue § 13(b)’s books and records requirement.
But on the other hand, this proposal would strengthen § 13(b)’s
internal auditing requirements because it would better enable
outside auditors to detect flaws in auditing controls. Stronger
controls should yield more accurate books and records. Thus,
even if devaluing the books and records requirement, this
proposal should increase the accuracy of corporate financials by
strengthening internal audit controls.
The second response to the skeptic’s argument attacks a false
assumption. The argument is only correct assuming § 13(b)
currently achieves the optimal level of deterrence. If § 13(b)
overdeters, the marginal value of additional accounting
protections is low because the additional protections will cost
more than their corresponding benefit. If this is the case,
decreasing § 13(b)’s deterrent effect would enable management to
reach the optimal cost–benefit balance. The next subsection
argues that the current construction of § 13(b) actually overdeters
bad accounting practices.
b. Cost of Overdeterrence
If society wished to deter all crime, it could employ all
citizens as police officers and impose disproportionately high
punishments.333 Such a policy could deter crime entirely as both
the likelihood of apprehension and the severity of the punishment
would increase dramatically. But society does not do this because
such a system would tax the entirety of our wealth. The cost of
deterring all crime is simply too high. As a result, such a system
of criminal enforcement is inefficient.334 This hypothetical reflects
the basic concept of overdeterrence. The purpose of deterrence is
333. See John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 588 (1982) (arguing that
such enforcement of crime would be inefficient).
334. See Thomas C. Galligan Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to
Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 696–97 (2005) (noting that
overdeterrence leads to inefficient use of resources); W. David Slawson, The Role
of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 227 (1990) (indicating
that both overdeterrence and underdeterrence are inefficient).
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to reduce the effects of socially harmful behavior; law overdeters
where the punishment for socially harmful behavior exceeds the
harm caused by such behavior.335
For instance, assume a corporation could prevent $100,000 in
harm to investors by implementing $50,000 worth of new internal
audit controls. Assume further that the corporation would violate
§ 13(b) by failing to implement these new controls. If the fine was
$100,000, the corporation would implement the new controls
because it would cost less than the fine. Such action is socially
optimal because $100,000 in harm is prevented at a cost of
$50,000. But if the fine was $1 million dollars, the corporation
may implement internal auditing controls worth well over
$100,000 in light of the disproportionate liability. In this
situation, the potential fine overdeters because the audit controls
would cost more than the harm they prevented.336
Section 13(b)’s overdeterrence operates in a different fashion,
however. Rather than affect the punishment variable in the
deterrence equation, § 13(b) affects the perceived likelihood of
apprehension. Section 3(b) increases the perceived likelihood of
apprehension precisely because it does not require scienter.
Regarding Rule 10b–5, which requires scienter, some scholars
argue that overdeterrence is not an issue because parties can
avoid liability at no additional cost by acting without knowledge
or reckless disregard of the fraud.337 Section 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2
do not require scienter; therefore, individuals cannot protect
themselves fully. “Without a crystal ball,” individuals face great
uncertainty in these situations.338 Individuals likely compensate
335. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879–80 (1998) (arguing that such
punishments are “socially wasteful”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 353–54
(1996) (indicating that society wastes limited enforcement resources by
overdeterring certain actions).
336. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 335, at 879–80 (arguing that
excessive punitive damages cause firms to take excessive steps to prevent
potential liability).
337. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for
Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 692
n.8 (1992) (arguing that parties can avoid Rule 10b–5 liability at no cost simply
by acting in good-faith).
338. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2185 (2010).
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for this risk by taking excessive precaution even if that excessive
precaution would not necessarily increase the accuracy of
financial information.339
This proposal would resolve this problem by providing
greater protection to corporate actors. Under this proposal, these
corporate actors would perceive a lower risk of conviction because
they could take concrete steps to avoid liability. Because the
standard of reasonableness under the due diligence defense
remains “exceedingly vague,”340 this proposal would not eliminate
all uncertainty. Nevertheless, this proposal should improve the
current situation because it would provide at least some means to
avoid liability. In doing so, the proposal would better allow
corporate actors to reach the optimal cost–benefit approach to
ensuring accurate financial records.
3. Maintaining the Benefits of § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2
In addition to reducing costs, this proposal would maintain
§ 13(b)’s benefits through a system of dual liability. Under this
proposal, the corporation itself could not claim due diligence. If
the sanctions are large enough, the corporation should take
internal action to deter its employees from violating the
statute.341 Internal sanctions could include a wide range of
punishments, from dismissal to the denial of a promotion. To
some extent, these sanctions may deter corporate employees more
effectively than civil liability.342 Because imposing civil liability
339. See id. at 2184 (arguing that overdeterrence can increase capital costs
by causing companies to overinvest in precautionary measures).
340. Michaels, supra note 259, at 331; cf. David G. Owen, Toward a Proper
Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1661, 1680 (1997) (indicating that much of tort law also rests on “vague
principles” of reasonableness); James A. Henderson Jr., Process Constraints in
Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 922 (1982) (noting that any standard of
reasonableness is inherently vague).
341. See Coffee, supra note 303, at 407–08 (noting that the Chicago School of
legal scholars supports entity liability because it incentivizes senior
management to take measures to avoid liability (citing RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 236 (2d ed. 1977))).
342. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management
Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1248 (2003) (noting that formal corporate sanctions
strengthen informal corporate sanctions, which also influence the behavior of

950

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2015)

requires a trial, individuals view the likelihood of conviction as
low.343 Even though internal sanctions may be less severe than
civil liability, the threat of internal sanctions is more palpable.344
As a result, corporate employees may fear internal sanctions
more than civil liability.
This argument assumes that management seeks to maximize
corporate profits; otherwise, management would not police
employees who threaten corporate profits.345 In some
circumstances, however, managers may benefit personally by
disregarding corporate profits.346 Entity liability would serve
little purpose in these scenarios because it would pass the cost of
the manager’s illegal action onto the corporation.347 Through
entity liability, this proposal should incentivize management to
police corporate employees, and, through individual liability, this
proposal should deter individual managers from intentionally
violating § 13(b) or Rule 13b2–2.348
corporate employees).
343. See Coffee, supra note 303, at 410 (noting that the procedural
requirements associated with a trial lessen the perceived likelihood of
conviction).
344. See id. (“[T]he risk of punishment by the corporation may be much
greater than the risk of punishment by the legal system.”).
345. See id. at 393 (arguing that corporate deterrence must consider agency
problems inherent in the corporate form); David S. Ruder, Public Obligations of
Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213–14 (1965) (noting that
corporate law traditionally placed fiduciary obligations on managers to ensure
that managers considered the interest of shareholders in maximizing profit).
346. See Coffee, supra note 303, at 393 (noting that individual managers can
benefit personally to the detriment of the corporation). For instance, the vice
president of a company who seeks to become president may falsify corporate
records to show that his division was incredibly profitable, thus increasing his
chances of becoming president. See id. (arguing that lower-level employees may
resort to the same tactics to avoid dismissal or demotion).
347. See id. (arguing that it is “extraordinarily difficult” to deter corporate
impropriety solely by sanctioning the corporation). But see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 29–30 (2010) (arguing that
sanctioning the corporation entices management, either out of loyalty or selfinterest, to change harmful corporate practices).
348. See Coffee, supra note 303, at 393 (arguing that individual liability is
necessary given the “fundamental incongruence” that can arise between the
interests of management and the interests of the corporation); Ruder, supra
note 345, at 213–14 (arguing that management’s fiduciary duties serve to
dampen this fundamental incongruence between the interests of management
and shareholders).
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This proposal would be particularly effective in light of
“sweeping” liability insurance that shields management from
personal liability.349 Currently, individual liability is reserved for
offenses unprotected by these policies, such as intentional
violations of the law.350 By maintaining individual liability for
intentional violations and imposing entity liability for
unintentional violations, this proposal should cause management
to do two things. As discussed earlier, management could
sanction employees who create unacceptable legal risks.351 In
addition, managers may delegate legally risky tasks to
subordinates.352 By allowing subordinates to claim due diligence,
this proposal should provide greater protection to those who bear
the risk of liability.
In addition to imposing risk on junior employees, liability
protection also allocates risk to shareholders. This is due to
corporate “overspill.”353 Put succinctly: “[W]hen the corporation
catches a cold, someone else sneezes.”354 In particular, the cost of
liability tends to fall on shareholders because liability decreases
the value of their shares.355 While this phenomenon occurs due to
349. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1984); see Mae Kuykendall, Assessment
and Evaluation: Retheorizing the Evolving Rules of Director Liability, 8 J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (1999) (noting that corporations tend to grant directors blanket
liability protection rather than indemnify directors on a case-by-case basis).
350. See Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the
Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 235 (noting that the
standard liability insurance policy does not cover intentional harm); Kraakman,
supra note 349, at 859 (arguing that liability insurance and indemnification
policies make individual liability a less effective tool of deterrence).
351. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 347, at 29–30 (noting that management
may change harmful corporate practices in response to entity liability);
Kraakman, supra note 349, at 859 (arguing that corporations focus heavily on
internal monitoring because the entity itself “bears the brunt” of legal liability).
352. See Kraakman, supra note 349, at 860 (arguing that management has
an incentive to delegate legally risky practices to subordinates even without
liability protection); see also Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and
Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1315 n.187 (2011)
(noting that WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers was “very fond” of delegating “dirty
work” to his subordinates); Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 221, 270 (2004) (noting that Ebbers’ penchant for delegating legally
risky tasks made it difficult to connect him to WorldCom’s fraud).
353. Coffee, supra note 303, at 387 n.4.
354. Id. at 401.
355. See id. (noting that bondholders, creditors, employees, and consumers
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the corporate form itself,356 liability protection exacerbates this
problem by forcing the corporation to bear the costs of
management’s liability in addition to its own.357
In this context, however, shareholders are in a better position
than management to bear the risk of liability.358 Shareholders
never risk more than the value of their investment in a
corporation,359 and shareholders can diversify this risk by
investing in numerous companies over an active securities
market.360 In liability terms, shareholders can mitigate the risk
that one company will incur liability by investing in fifty other
companies that do not incur liability. As a result of decreasing
their risk exposure, shareholders have a lower risk premium and
are more willing to invest in other ventures.361 Thus continues
the diversification cycle.
Managers, on the other hand, cannot diversify risk because
they invest their managerial skills in a single company.362 And
the consequences of their investment frequently flow beyond that
single company. Managers invest their reputation in a company,
may also bear the cost of corporate liability).
356. See id. at 387 n.4 (noting that the overspill problem is inherent in the
corporate form).
357. See Kraakman, supra note 349, at 858 (arguing that the overspill
problem is more prevalent if management enjoys “sweeping” liability
protection).
358. See id. at 862–67 (arguing that placing the risk of liability on
shareholders is a less costly means of deterring corporate impropriety).
359. See id. at 862 (“Limited liability assures that shareholders retain an
unlimited claim to the profits of successful firms but never risk more than the
value of their shares in unsuccessful ones.”).
360. See id. at 862–63 (arguing that active security markets allow
shareholders to diversify at low cost); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited
Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of
the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 (1994) (noting that investors can plan for
increased risk exposure, which makes them better risk bearers than tort victims
as well).
361. See Kraakman, supra note 349, at 864 (arguing that undiversified risk
bearers are more likely to forgo an investment opportunity because they are
overly risk averse).
362. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance and Executive
Compensation in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 834, 838 (noting that managers typically hold “large
undiversified equity stakes” in the company whereas shareholders typically
diversify their holdings); Kraakman, supra note 349, at 864 (describing
managers as “undiversified risk bearers”).
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and poor performance could adversely affect their ability to find
future positions in other companies.363 Acting in their own selfinterest, therefore, managers may prefer actions that promise a
lower return with less risk over actions that promise a higher
return with more risk.364 Because they are risk averse, managers
may demand greater compensation for incurring risk than would
shareholders. Thus, this proposal would efficiently allocate risk to
parties who could bear the risk at a lower cost—shareholders.
Knowing that shareholders would bear any bad
consequences, managers would not necessarily incur excessive
risk because there are other incentives to comply with § 13(b). As
mentioned earlier, managers invest their reputation in a
company, and § 13(b) liability could limit a manger’s future job
prospects. Furthermore, shareholders could respond to a § 13(b)
violation by policing management or by removing managers that
expose the corporation to liability.365 But such action would entail
significant collective action problems, so shareholders would
likely respond by selling their shares instead.366 This response
could also affect managers negatively if they are compensated in
stock options.367 These outside incentives should deter managers
363. See Kraakman, supra note 349, at 863 (arguing that poor managerial
performance damages a manager’s reputation); Joshua Andrix, Note, Negotiated
Shame: An Inquiry into the Efficacy of Settlement in Imposing Publicity
Sanctions on Corporations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1867–68 (2007) (arguing
that public sanctioning can harm a manager’s reputation, which should serve to
deter illegal activity).
364. See John C. Coffee Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in
the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) (noting that undiversified
managers have “good reason” to be risk averse and that diversified shareholders
have “every reason” to be risk neutral).
365. See David Kerem, Change We Can Believe In: Comparative Perspectives
on the Criminalization of Corporate Negligence, 14 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS.
L. 95, 97 (2012) (noting that proponents of entity liability argue that
shareholders can police management effectively in response to bearing the cost
of liability).
366. See id. (noting the “collective difficulty shareholders face” in holding
management responsible for creating unnecessary legal risk).
367. See Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them:
Corporate Officer’s Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 235
(2009) (noting that stock options create an incentive to increase the value of the
stock so that the recipient can exercise the option and realize a gain); Jan C.
Nishizawa, Ethical Conflicts Facing In-House Counsel: Dealing with Recent
Trends and an Opportunity for Positive Change, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 849,
851 (2007) (noting that corporations often use stock options to entice talented
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from taking excessive risk even though shareholders would bear
the brunt of the risk.
To summarize, this proposal would allow the SEC to impose
individual liability for intentional violations of § 13(b). As a
result, providing a due diligence defense to individuals who act
reasonably would shift liability to the corporation. In response,
management should monitor employees to limit liability
exposure. While entity liability would transfer the risk of liability
from management to shareholders, shareholders could bear the
risk at a lower cost. In addition, this proposal would preserve
many outside incentives to comply with § 13(b). All in all, this
proposal should maintain § 13(b)’s ability to ensure accurate
financial records.
V. Conclusion
The circuit split regarding whether § 13(b) and Rule 13b2–2
require scienter offers an opportunity to reevaluate these
provisions. Such a reevaluation reveals that Congress and the
SEC can decrease costs and maintain benefits by including a due
diligence defense. This serves as a reminder that even cures have
ill side-effects—sometimes, regulations impose costs beyond their
benefits. Congress, the SEC, and policy-makers alike must
occasionally revisit regulations, asking whether society can
accomplish its regulatory goals at a lower cost.

lawyers and executives to the company); Kraakman, supra note 349, at 863
(noting that stock options give management a financial incentive to increase the
value of the company’s stock).

